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introduction
The well-intentioned efforts to help victims must be judged
by their results, not our intentions. Thus what we need to
do is to treat domestic violence as a subject for relentless
research, testing a wide range of solutions, rather than
simply assuming that punishment ‘works’.1
-Lawrence Sherman.

When Sara Schmidt reported her husband’s domestic abuse,
she never could have imagined that just a week later she would
be dead in her in-laws’ Wisconsin driveway.2 After her murder, it
came to light that Sara had endured abusive behavior from her
husband of fifteen years for some time.3 After several years of
verbal and emotional abuse, his abuse allegedly turned physical
on December 31, 2017.4 That night, instead of attending a party
to ring in the new year, Robert Schmidt held a gun to his wife’s
head and raped her.5 On January 2, 2018, Sara filed a police
report stating that she no longer felt that she or her children were
safe living with Robert, but did not specifically request that he
be arrested.6 Wisconsin is a mandatory arrest state, however, so
investigators arrested Robert the same day.7 On January 5,
Robert was released on bond.8 Around dinnertime four days later,
Sarah pulled her van into her in-laws’ driveway to drop off the

1.

Belinda Luscombe, When Not to Arrest an Abuser in a Domestic
Violence Case, TIME (Mar. 5, 2014), http://time.com/12682/whennot-to-arrest-an-abuser-in-a-domestic-violence-case/
[https://
perma.cc/P5MM-8C4V].

2.

Allison Dirr, In 10 Days, A Husband’s Violence Escalated From A
Brutal Assault to Murder in Public View, POST CRESCENT (Aug.
13, 2018, 6:17 AM), https://www.postcrescent.com/story/news/
crime/2018/08/13/appleton-murder-suicide-robert-schmidtescalated-10-days-assault/810055002/
[https://perma.cc/4Z3ZER2T].

3.

Id.

4.

Id.

5.

Id.

6.

Id.

7.

Id.

8.

Id.
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couple’s three children, but she was greeted by an irate Robert.9
Robert pulled out a gun, forced Sarah into the passenger seat of
the van and shot her to death before turning the gun on himself.10
Their three young children were inside the house.11
For officers dealing with domestic violence, situations like
these are common. In this area of Fox Valley, Wisconsin, the
sheriff’s office handled three situations similar to this one within
a matter of months.12 Wisconsin, like many states, has legislation
that requires officers to arrest an alleged abuser when responding
to calls or reports of domestic violence.13 While these laws were
once hailed as a solution to domestic violence across the country,
recent studies have called the effectiveness of these laws into
question.14 Instead of protecting victims, these laws may be
causing more harm to victims in the long run.
This Note argues that mandatory-arrest laws are not effective
in protecting domestic violence victims. Part I will examine why
9.

Id.

10.

Id.

11.

Id.

12.

Id.

13.

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.075(2) (2016); see also ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.65.530(a) (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13– 3601(B) (2018);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.6 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b38b(a) (2018); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031(a) (2019); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-2307 (b)(1) (2019); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 236.12(2)(b)
(2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140 A(1) (2015); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19-A § 4012 (5) (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7 (3)
(2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.137 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:2521 (West 2019); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(1) (2019); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.032(A)(1)(a) (2019); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 133.055(2)(a), (b), (c), (d) (2019); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-293(b), (c) (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23A-3-2.1 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.2 (2) (2013); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§10.31.100 (2)(a), (d) (2019).

14.

See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman & Heather M. Harris, Increased
Death Rates of Domestic Violence Victims from Arresting vs.
Warning Suspects in the Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment
(MilDVE), 11 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2015); Radha
Iyengar, Does the Certainty of Arrest Reduce Domestic Violence?
Evidence from Mandatory and Recommended Arrest Laws (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13186, 2007),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13186.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P4Q9-SR7J].
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states began adopting these laws. First, it will discuss a study by
Lawrence Sherman indicating that mandatory arrest was the
most effective means of deterring future violence in relationships
plagued by domestic violence. It will then discuss the Violence
Against Women Act and how its drafters relied on Sherman’s
study in deciding to allocate grant money to jurisdictions that
enacted mandatory-arrest laws for domestic violence.
Part II will discuss the components of present-day
mandatory-arrest laws and how variations in state statutes can
change the effect that they have on victims. The first section will
discuss the different forms of arrest statutes and how the words
“shall” and “may” can change what is required under the statute.
The second section will discuss when the term “family member”
is used in the statute and the limits it can place on the ability of
police to arrest suspects. Finally, it will discuss dual arrests and
how including a policy of arresting the “primary aggressor” in an
arrest statute can help eliminate them.
Part III will discuss the present effect that these statutes have
on victims. It will first review Sherman’s more recent study and
other subsequent reports that argue that his findings in his
original study were faulty. These studies indicate that mandatory
arrest statutes are likely not as effective at protecting victims as
originally thought. It will then discuss both the physical and
mental harm victims may suffer as a result of these laws.
Part IV will develop recommendations as to changes that
should be made to domestic violence arrest laws to best protect
victims. It argues that jurisdictions should adopt laws that allow
for guided police discretion by following the preferential-arrest
model. It will also argue that police departments should provide
more outreach programs to help victims. It will discuss two
inventive methods developed in police departments: the
“cocooning” method and the creation of domestic violence units
in police departments that work hand in hand with victim
advocacy groups to better respond to domestic violence calls.

I.
A.

Background
Sherman’s First Study

During the early 1970’s and 80’s, most police departments felt
that instances of domestic violence were problems for the family
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to work through, not the police.15 Instead of viewing it as criminal
conduct, officers felt that domestic violence was a normal method
of “controlling” a spouse, and therefore was outside the scope of
police intervention.16 Most instances of domestic violence were
characterized as misdemeanors, with arrests being a last resort
rather than a common option.17 Indeed, many jurisdictions barred
arrests for any misdemeanor assault unless the act actually
occurred in front of the officer.18 As a result, there was little legal
intervention to help curb the torment plaguing victims of
domestic violence.19
Activism surrounding domestic violence began to increase in
the mid-1970s.20 Several clinical psychologists argued that there
should be increased police intervention when officers respond to
calls of domestic violence.21 Several studies also publicized
statistics on the actual rates of domestic violence in the country,
prompting a battered women’s movement aimed at increasing
domestic violence awareness.22 These groups called for a more
serious approach to domestic violence policy and a change in
15.

See Jeffrey Fagan, Criminalization of Domestic Violence: Promises
and Limits, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE 1, 3 (1995), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/crimdom.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7PF8-68BM].

16.

Deborah Epstein, Redefining the State’s Response to Domestic
Violence: Past Victories and Future Challenges, 1 GEO. J. GENDER
& L. 127, 128–129 (1999).

17.

Nick Keppler, In Allegheny County, Domestic Violence Offenders
Often Avoid the Most Serious Punishment, PUBLIC SOURCE (Feb.
18,
2019),
https://www.publicsource.org/allegheny-countydomestic-violence-offenders-avoid-most-serious-punishment/
[https://perma.cc/Y58P-CXWU]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 250231, POLICE RESPONSE TO
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 2006–2015 (2017).

18.

Kathleen J. Ferraro, Police Woman Battering, 36 SOC. PROBS. 61
(1989).

19.

See id. at 61–62.

20.

JAMI AKE & GRETCHEN ARNOLD, A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANTIVIOLENCE-AGAINST-WOMEN MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 3
(2017).

21.

Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Searching for Answers: Annual Evaluation
Report on Drugs and Crime: 1992, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, at 31
(1992).

22.

Fagan, supra note 15, at 12–13.
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police intervention strategies.23 As a result, the National Academy
of Sciences issued a report calling for an assessment of current
police policies and supported deterrence-oriented practices.24 The
National Institute of Justice took note and allocated funding for
studies on the effects of deterrence-based policies.25
From 1981 to 1982, Lawrence W. Sherman conducted one
such study evaluating the effectiveness of police responses to calls
regarding domestic violence in Minneapolis, Minnesota.26 This
research sought to compare three different police approaches to
domestic violence: arrest, an order for the suspect to leave the
scene of the assault for eight hours, or some form of mediation at
the officer’s discretion.27 Using a lottery system, officers employed
one of these three methods when answering calls of misdemeanor
domestic violence.28 Victims were then subject to detailed followup interviews every two weeks for twenty-four weeks to see how
the police response affected their lives.29 A total of 314 case
reports were evaluated.30 Only 161 of the victims followed through
with the 12 interviews.31 During these interviews, Sherman looked
for any indications that the individual arrested had repeated their
domestic violence within the six-month period and determined if
they had a prior criminal record.32 He also looked at victims’
perspectives and how their lives had changed due to the specific
form of police response used.33

23.

Clara Van Eck, Changing the Message: Battered Women’s
Advocates & Their Fight Against Domestic Violence at the Local,
State, and Federal Level, 1970s–1990s, OLD DOMINION U. 1, 28
(2017).

24.

Fagan, supra note 15, at 13.

25.

ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & JOAN PETERSILIA, THE NAT’L INST. OF
JUSTICE, 25 YEARS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH 15–16 (1994).

26.

LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN & RICHARD A. BERK, THE MINNEAPOLIS
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EXPERIMENT 1-8 (1984).

27.

Id. at 4.

28.

Id. at 2.

29.

Id. at 3.

30.

Id.

31.

Id. at 5.

32.

Id. at 6.

33.

Id. at 7.
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Through these interviews, Sherman concluded that
individuals who were arrested had the lowest percentage of
repeated violence (19%), compared to those given advice (37%)
and those sent away (33%).34 Police records concerning repeat
offenders revealed similar statistics.35 Further analysis indicated
that these findings were the same across the board for all suspects
regardless of race, employment, education, or criminal history.36
Based on these findings, Sherman concluded that arrest was the
most effective form of police action for purposes of deterring
future domestic violence.37
Furthermore, Sherman found that arrest was most effective
when the police listened to the victim’s account of the domestic
violence.38 Out of 194 victims, 9% reported repeated violence
when the police took the victim’s statement, as opposed to the
26% who experienced repeated violence after an arrest where the
police simply arrested the suspect.39 Sherman argued that victims
may be “empowered” by being able to give their account of the
story.40 He theorized that if police ignored a victim’s statement,
then the suspect may feel that the arrest was arbitrary and be
less deterred from repeating violence in the future.41 Because of
these findings, Sherman encouraged jurisdictions to implement
mandatory or preferred-arrest laws to help decrease instances of
repeated violence by domestic abusers.42 The study received a
great deal of media attention, prompting a response from many
police departments across the country.43 While only fifteen
jurisdictions had mandatory-arrest statutes on the books before

34.

Id.

35.

Id. at 6.

36.

Id. at 7.

37.

Id.

38.

Id.

39.

Id.

40.

Id.

41.

Id.

42.

Id. at 8.

43.

Luscombe, supra note 1.
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this study was published, that number increased to twenty-three
soon after publication.44
B.

The Violence Against Women Act

Studies like Sherman’s, and pressure from grassroots
campaigns by women’s groups, prompted Congress to take
action.45 The Violence Against Women Act (the Act) was first
passed in 1994 and provided both a celebrated and controversial
response to domestic and sexual violence against women.46 The
Act outlined funding initiatives and proposed policy measures
that jurisdictions should implement in order to better address
domestic violence,47 including “the use of mandatory arrests of
accused offenders.”48 The Act did not specify which provisions
should be included in these laws. The only guidance it offered was
to discourage the arrest of both the victim and abuser, and it
explicitly argued that mediation should be prohibited in instances
of domestic violence.49 Furthermore, the Act indicated a
preference for more aggressive prosecution policies.50 This led to
policies that allowed the prosecution of domestic violence cases
regardless of whether the victim cooperated.51 This Act
incentivized the use of mandatory arrest because the jurisdictions
that passed these types of laws would be eligible for federal grant

44.

David Hirschel, Domestic Violence Cases: What Research Shows
About Arrest and Dual Arrest Rates, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (July
25,
2008),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/222679.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/L4S9-X7Y8].

45.

See Kate Pickert, What’s Wrong With the Violence Against
Women Act?, TIME (Feb. 27, 2013), http://nation.time.com/
2013/02/27/whats-wrong-with-the-violence-against-women-act/.
[https://perma.cc/9WPK-K76F].

46.

Id.

47.

Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13925 (1994).

48.

Violence Against Women Act of 1991, H.R. 1502, 102nd Cong.
(1991).

49.

See id.

50.

Id.

51.

Pickert, supra note 45.
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money.52 However, there was nothing that identified how this
money should be used.53
The Act was subsequently renewed in 2000 and 2005 with
similar provisions relating to mandatory arrest.54 It also included
language emphasizing that the Act was not limited to the
protection of women, but rather the protection of victims in
general.55 This was a direct response to several critics of the act
who argued that the provisions painted all women as victims and
all men as abusers.56 Furthermore, the Act provided for more
funding for research into the factors that lead to abusive behavior
after several women’s groups claimed that the Act was simply a
surface-level fix to a much bigger problem.57 Other problems arose
in 2012 when the Act was again up for reauthorization.58
Conservative Republicans opposed provisions extending services
under the Act to undocumented immigrants and LGBT
individuals.59 The bill was not reauthorized until 2013; it still
contained provisions encouraging the implementation of
mandatory arrest statutes.60

52.

Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13925 (1994).

53.

Id.

54.

See History of VAWA, LEGALMOMENTUM, https://www.legal
momentum.org/history-vawa [https://perma.cc/Q5SH-V9L4] (last
visited Jan. 27, 2020).

55.

Violence Against Women and Department of Justice
Reauthorization Act of 2005, H.R. 3402, 109th Cong. (2005).

56.

Janice Shaw Crouse, The Violence Against Women Act Should
Outrage Decent People, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP. (Mar. 19,
2012), https://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-the-violenceagainst-women-act-be-reauthorized/the-violence-against-womenact-should-outrage-decent-people
[https://perma.cc/YCP6QNGV].

57.

Violence Against Women and Department of Justice
Reauthorization Act of 2005, H.R. 3402, 109th Cong. (2005);
Crouse, supra note 56.

58.

Kate Bolduan, House Passes GOP Version of Violence Against
Women Act Renewal, CNN (May 16, 2012), https://www.
cnn.com/2012/05/16/politics/gop-violence-againstwomen/index.html [https://perma.cc/ESD5-TQKR].

59.

Id.

60.

Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th
Cong. (2013).

445

Health Matrix·Volume 30·2020
Mandatory-Arrest Laws and Domestic Violence

Many states began implementing statutes with either
mandatory or preferential arrest provisions soon after the Act was
passed in 1994.61 As time has gone by, however, researchers have
questioned whether these measures have actually helped victims
of domestic violence.62 While the Act has increased rates of
prosecution for these crimes, there is little evidence conclusively
indicating that there has also been a decrease in violence.63 Many
proponents of the Act argue that the 64% decrease in intimatepartner violence between 1994 and 2010 was largely attributed to
the push for stricter mandatory-arrest laws.64 However, this drop
occurred at the same time at which violent crime rates decreased
dramatically nationwide.65 Additionally, domestic violence is a
severely under-reported crime, making statistical analysis
particularly challenging.66 Therefore, it is difficult to know the full
effect that the Act had on domestic-violence rates.

II. State Mandatory-Arrest Laws
While the Act prompted some states to implement
mandatory-arrest laws, it did not give those states much guidance
as to the contents of those laws.67 What resulted was a stark
disparity nationwide in laws governing officer conduct when
responding to calls about domestic violence. Three distinct types
of laws have developed: mandatory arrest, preference for arrest,
and officer discretion.68 Many laws also have language prompting
61.

See Pickert, supra note 45.

62.

Id.

63.

Id.

64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66.

Id.

67.

Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13925 (1994); Violence
Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005, H.R. 3402, 109th Cong. (2005); Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th Cong. (2013).

68.

See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530(a) (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§13– 3601(B) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.6 (2019); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46b-38b(a) (2018); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031 (a)
(2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2307 (b)(1) (2019); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 236.12(2)(b) (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140 A(1) (2015); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 13701(b) (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209a
§ 6 (7) (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311 (2)(A) (2019); N.D.
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the officer to identify the primary aggressor in cases of mutual
accusations.69 Others have provisions that specifically identify
which individuals are able to claim that they are a victim of
domestic violence70: Some laws limit the definition of “victim” to
family members of the accused aggressor, while others have
extended the definition to include dating partners or unmarried
persons living in the same residence.71
A.

May vs. Shall

Whether a jurisdiction has a mandatory-arrest, preference for
arrest, or discretionary-arrest law depends on whether the statute
contains—or omits entirely—the word “may” or “shall.” Statutes
that contain “may” 72 allow the responding police officers the most
discretion.73 This approach assumes that the responding officer
CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-10 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-619 (a)
(2016); ALA. CODE § 15-10-3(8) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1904(A)(4) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 741.29 (2019); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-4-20(a) (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906 (2) (2006); IDAHO
CODE § 19-603 (6) (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.15a (2019);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15a-401(b)(1)(2) (2018).
69.

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(b) (2019); FLA. STAT. § 741.29
(2019); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 2-204 (A)(1) (2007); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(B)(3)(b) (2019).

70.

See HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906 1(a) (2006); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/112A-30 (2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.005(2)(a) (West
2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 4012 (5) (2017); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 764.15a (2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1-7(A)
(2018).

71.

See Domestic Violence Arrest Policies by State, AM. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/domestic
_violence/Domestic%20Violence%20Arrest%20Policies%20by%20
State%202011%20(complete).pdf [https://perma.cc/SHK5-EASW]
(last visited, Oct 3, 2018).

72.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03 (a)(4) (2015) (“Any peace
officer may arrest, without warrant persons who the peace officer
has probable cause to believe have committed an offense involving
family violence.”).

73.

See ALA. CODE § 15-10-3(8) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1904(A)(4) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 741.29 (2019); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-4-20(a) (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906 (2) (2006); IDAHO
CODE § 19-603(6) (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.15a (2019);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15a-401(b)(1)(2) (2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 993-7 (3) (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-404.02(1) (2017); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-1-7(A) (2018).
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will have the best ability to determine if an arrest is necessary or
not.74 To handle the situation properly, the officer will need to
talk to the parties to see what exactly went on and make their
own determination.75 Overall, twenty-five states have this type of
statute.76
The second type of statute is the pro-arrest statute that has
been enacted in six states.77 These statutes often do not include
“may” or “shall” at all.78 Instead, they simply state that arrest is
the preferred action in the situation.79 These statutes allow
officers slightly more discretion than they would have in a
mandatory arrest setting. Jurisdictions that employ this approach
encourage arrests in domestic violence situations but ultimately
leave the choice up to the responding officer.80
The final category is the mandatory-arrest law. These
statutes contain the word “shall” in the provision, making it
mandatory for police officers to arrest an individual when
dispatched for domestic violence.81 This is modified by the
74.

April M. Zeoli et al., Mandatory, Preferred, or Discretionary: How
the Classification of Domestic Violence Warrantless Arrest Laws
Impacts Their Estimated Effects on Intimate Partner Homicide, 35
EVALUATION REV. 129, 132 (2011).

75.

Id. at 133.

76.

ALA. CODE § 15-10-3(8) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1904(A)(4) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 741.29 (2019); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-4-20(a) (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906(2) (2006); IDAHO
CODE § 19-603(6) (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.15a (2019);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15a-401(b)(1)(2) (2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 993-7 (3) (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-404.02(1) (2017); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-1-7(A) (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 196(6) (2018); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2711(a) (2019); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art.14.03 (A)(4) (2015); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-1002 (a) (2010).

77.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(b) (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
209a, § 6(7) (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311 (2)(A) (2019);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-10 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3619 (a) (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-113(a)(1)(A) (2019).

78.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311(2)(A) (2019) (“Arrest is the preferred
response in partner or family member assault cases . . . ”).

79.

Id.

80.

Id.

81.

ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530 (A) (2018) ( “An officer shall arrest a
person when there is probable cause to believe that a crime of
domestic violence has been committed in past 12 hours.”); see also
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13– 3601(B) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT.
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“probable cause” standard. In order to comply with the Fourth
Amendment under such laws, the Supreme Court held in
Brinegar v. U.S. that officers may not make a warrantless arrest
without first having probable cause.82 The Court held that,
“probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances
known to the officer are sufficient to warrant a reasonably
prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed or is
committing a crime.”83 The officer must believe that the
individual being arrested is responsible for committing a crime.84
Many jurisdictions allow their officers to base assertions of
probable cause on evidence like injuries to a party, statements
from witnesses, and even uncorroborated statements by a
victim.85 These laws have been enacted in twenty-two states.86
§ 18-6-803.6 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38b(a) (2018); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-1031 (a) (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2307 (b)(1)
(2019); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12(2)(b) (2018); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 46-2140 A(1) (2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 4012 (5)
(2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7 (3) (2017); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 171.137 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:25-21 (West 2019); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(1) (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2935.032(A)(1)(a) (2019); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.055(2)(a), (b),
(c), (d) (2019); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-29-3(b), (c) (2014); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-25-70; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-2.1 (2015);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.2 (2) (2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§10.31.100 (2)(a), (d) (2019).
82.

Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 171 (1949).

83.

Id. at 175.

84.

Id.

85.

D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031 (a) (2019) (“ . . . probable cause to
believe physical injury or the treat thereof has occurred.”); W. VA.
CODE §§ 48-27-1002 (a), (b) (2010).

86.

ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530 (A) (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13–
3601(B) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.6 (2019); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46b-38b(a) (2018); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031 (a) (2019);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2307 (b)(1) (2019); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 236.12(2)(b) (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140 A(1) (2015); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 4012 (5) (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 993-7 (3) (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.137 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2c:25-21 (West 2019); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(1) (2019);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.032(A)(1)(a) (2019); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 133.055(2)(a), (b), (c), (d) (2019); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-293(b), (c) (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 23A-3-2.1 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.2 (2) (2013);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§10.31.100 (2)(a), (d) (2019).
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No state statute includes any language indicating that the
officers should take what the victim wants into account when
deciding whether to make an arrest.87 This is designed to allow
prosecution in situations in which the victim refuses to press
charges against their abuser.88 Removing this discretion was
intended to diminish the burden placed on the victim.89 The
theory behind this is that the victim may feel psychologically
trapped by the relationship or attached to their abuser.90 While
they may call the police in the first place, they may feel hesitant
or afraid to ask for an arrest once the police arrive.91
B.

Definition of “Family Member”

According to most mandatory-arrest laws, the relationship
between the parties determines whether an assault is an act of
domestic violence and mandates arrest.92 Most domestic violence
statutes provide that the violence must be perpetrated against a
“family member,” a definition that changes with each
jurisdiction.93 However, this limitation can exclude some victims
of domestic violence because the definition may not include their
situation. Some of these statutes only cover what the term “family
member” may traditionally bring to mind - those related to an
individual through blood or marriage.94 In these jurisdictions,
individuals who are in dating relationships are not protected,

87.

Domestic Violence Arrest Policies by State, supra note 71.

88.

See Pickert, supra note 45.

89.

Eric L. Han, Note, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim
Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. (2003).

90.

See id.

91.

See generally Iyengar, supra note 14, at 88–89.

92.

Domestic Violence Arrest Policies by State, supra note 71.

93.

GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20 (A) (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906
(2) (2006); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/112A-30 (2009); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 431.005 (2)(a) (West 2012); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140 A(1)
(2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.15a (2019); MO. REV. STAT.
§455.085.1 (2019); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 14.03 (A)(4)
(2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §10.31.100 (1) (2019).

94.

GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20 (A)
ART. 14.03 (A)(4) (2015).

(2019); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
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whether they live together or not.95 Some jurisdictions have
attempted to address this deficiency by including those who are
not married but are jointly residing in the same residence.96
Others go as far as to include any individual who formerly resided
in the same residence.97 In these jurisdictions, an individual could
be arrested for domestic violence against any current or former
roommate.
While a great deal of domestic violence involves co-habitating
or married couples, violence also occurs between couples who do
not live together. Statutes that do not include individuals in
dating relationships not living together miss an entire subgroup
of victims who may suffer from domestic violence. Some
jurisdictions consequentially include individuals who have a child
together or are persons in dating relationships but are not living
together.98 This is the best approach when defining a “family
member” because it includes a wide range of individuals who are
victims of domestic violence.
C.

Definition of “Primary Aggressor”

Officers may have difficulty deciding the best course of action
when a call for domestic violence involves mutual accusations of
abuse by the parties. Some may feel compelled to arrest both
individuals—known as a “dual arrest”—if they each display signs
of injury.99 In dual-arrest jurisdictions, both the abuser and the
victim are arrested, taken to prison, and charged with domestic
violence.100 Dual arrest can lead to the arrest of victims who did
95.

GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20 (A)
ART. 14.03 (A)(4) (2015).

(2019); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

96.

HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906 (2) (2006); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/112A-30 (2009); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140 A(1) (2015); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 4012 (5) (2019); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
PROC. § 2-204 (A)(1) (2007); MO. REV. STAT. §455.085.1 (2019);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311 (2)(A) (2019); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 171.137 (2019); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10 (1) (2019); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2711(a) (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23a3-2.1
(2019); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §10.31.100 (1) (2019).

97.

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.15a (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23a32.1 (2019).

98.

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.005 (2)(a) (West 2012); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 764.15a (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23a3-2.1 (2019).

99.

Hirschel, supra note 44.

100. See id.
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not initiate the violence but did fight back against their abuser.101
This can be damaging to victims who may begin to feel that they
can no longer trust law enforcement to help them when they need
it most.102 Therefore, victims might not seek help when abused in
the future.103
Some statutes explicitly provide for dual arrest.104 Here,
discretion is taken away from the officer, and both parties must
be arrested.105 The burden is then placed on a judge to determine
which party is the victim in each case.106 While this might be
beneficial in some instances, it is not good for the system as a
whole. Victims who injure their abuser in self-defense are
routinely arrested, even though the system was designed to help
them.107 Because of this effect, providing for mandatory-dual
arrest is not the best option.
States with mandatory-arrest laws have seen a substantial
increase in the number of women arrested in connection with
domestic violence.108 In some areas, women account for nearly
twenty percent of those arrested for domestic violence, a
percentage that is actually higher than the estimated number of
female abusers.109 Studies indicate that over half of these arrestees
are victims of domestic violence themselves.110 Some researchers
101. Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n, National Domestic Violence
Prosecution Best Practices Guide, WHITE PAPER 1, 19 (2017).
102. Id. at 13.
103. See id.
104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(B) (2019)
discouraged, but not prohibited.”).

(“Dual

arrests

are

105. David Hirschel et al., Explaining the Prevalence, Context, and
Consequences of Dual Arrest in Intimate Partner Cases, U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE 1, 4 (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/218355.pdf [https://perma.cc/XWF8-NKY4].
106. Hirschel, supra note 44.
107. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: SexBias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS. – CIV.
LIBERTIES. L. REV. 623 (1980).
108. David Hirschel et al., Domestic Violence and Mandatory Arrest
Laws: To What Extent Do They Influence Police Arrest Decisions,
98 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 255, 259 (2007) [hereinafter
Influencing Police Arrest Decisions].
109. Iyengar, supra note 14, at 88.
110. Id.
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argue that this may be a result of dual arrests.111 Dual arrest rates
also depend heavily on the gender of those involved.112 If the
offender is female, it is three times more likely that police will
also arrest the victim.113 Dual arrest is also more likely if officers
are dealing with a homosexual couple.114 These statistics may
indicate that there is still implicit-police bias and sex-role
stereotyping when making arrests under these statutes.
In order to avoid dual arrest, many jurisdictions require
officers to identify the “primary aggressor” in the situation.115 The
most common definition of this term is the individual who
initiates the domestic violence in that instance.116 Many
jurisdictions have a list of factors they consider when working to
establish the primary aggressor.117 These can include the
111. Influencing Police Arrest Decisions, supra note 108, at 259.
112. Hirschel, supra note 44.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530 (B) (2018) (“When there are mutual
accusations, policy of determination of the primary aggressor.”);
See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-113 (a)(2)(A) (2019); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 13701(B) (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.6 (2019);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.29 4(b) (2019); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-4-20.1
(A), (B) (2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140 B(1) (2015); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 2-204 (B) (2007); MO. REV. STAT. §455.085.3
(2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311 (2)(B) (2019); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2935.03 (A)(1)(a)(ii) (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-293 (c) (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-3-619 (b) (2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.2 (3) (2013);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §10.31.100 (2)(c) (2019).
116. The Advocates for Human Rights, Determining the Predominant
Aggressor, STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, http://www.stopvaw
.org/determining_the_predominant_aggressor [https://perma.cc/
JB4E-42PQ] (last updated Dec. 26, 2018).
117. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530 (B) (2018) (“In determining whether a
person is a principal physical aggressor, the officer shall consider
(1) prior complaints of domestic violence; (2) the relative likelihood
of future injury from domestic violence to each person; (2) the
relative severity of the injuries inflicted on each person; and (4)
whether one of the persons acted in defense of self or others.”); see
also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-113 (a)(2)(A) (2019); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 13701(B) (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.6 (2019);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.29 4(b) (2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20.1
(A), (B) (2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140 B(1) (2015); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 2-204 (B) (2007); MO. REV. STAT. §455.085.3
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seriousness of injuries, the strength of both parties, criminal
history of both parties, and the demeanor of parties.118
Researchers have found that dual arrest rates are lower in states
where these primary-aggressor provisions have been
implemented.119
Critics argue that these provisions may also be biased against
male victims of domestic violence whose abusers are female.120
Factors like strength, skill and the demeanor of the parties can
work against male victims who may be perceived to be more
threatening because they are male.121 Others argue that offenders
may be able to manipulate a system that relies heavily on officers
making a decision with little information at hand.122 However,
research indicates that primary-aggressor provisions do cut down
on dual arrest and can be beneficial in the long run.123

III. Mandatory-arrest-law effectiveness
Researchers have conducted several studies to test the
effectiveness of mandatory-arrest laws. However well-intended
these laws were, these studies indicate that mandatory arrest may
not be the appropriate public policy to apply to domestic violence.
(2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311 (2)(B) (2019); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2935.03 (A)(1)(a)(ii) (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-293 (c) (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-3-619 (b) (2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.2 (3) (2013);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §10.31.100 (2)(c) (2019).
118. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530 (B) (2018); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 13701(B) (2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20.1 (A), (B) (2019).
119. Hirschel, supra note 44.
120. Deborah Vernon, Honors Thesis, Has Society Created Social
Injustice for Male Victims of Domestic Violence?, UTAH ST. UNIV.,
at 12 (2017); Emily M. Douglas & Denise A. Hines, The Helpseeking
Experiences of Men Who Sustain Intimate Partner Violence: An
Overlooked Population and Implications for Practice, 26(6) J. FAM.
VIOLENCE 473, 475 (Aug. 2011).
121. See generally Douglas & Hines, supra note 120.
122. Hirschel, supra note 44, at 260.
123. Sarah Smith, In Connecticut, Calling for Help Carries Risks for
Victims of Domestic Violence, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://www.propublica.org/article/in-connecticut-calling-forhelp-carries-risks-victims-of-domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/
FGC6-34V3].
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There are indications that, rather than protecting victims, these
laws increase victims’ mortality rates and incidents of intimatepartner homicide.124 The subsequent sections analyze why these
laws are generating more harm than good.
A.

Sherman’s Second Study

After Sherman’s first study was published, several other
researchers attempted to replicate his results.125 However, none
were able to do so.126 Furthermore, Sherman’s study was criticized
for having too short of a follow-up period and thus it ignored the
cyclical nature of domestic violence.127 While it was based on
deterrence theory, the study did not gather data on whether the
offenders actually feared reoffending because of the arrest.128
Studies in more recent years have evaluated the effects of
mandatory arrest in two instances: those in which the victim
reports the crime to the police and those in which the victim does
not.
In 2015, just over forty years after his first study, Sherman
published another study updating his findings.129 Overall, he
analyzed two different types of sources to come to his conclusions.
124. See Sherman & Harris, supra note 14, at 17.
125. Fagan, supra note 15; Anthony M. Pate & Edwin E. Hamilton,
Formal and Informal Deterrents to Domestic Violence: The Date
County Spouse Assault Experiment, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 691, 691
(1992).
126. See Sherman & Harris, supra note 14, at 1.
127. Domestic violence often follows a repeating cycle. This can involve
several phases including a tension-building phase, an abusive
incident, and a honeymoon phase. In the tension-building phase,
victim may feel as if they are walking on eggshells. This phase can
last for a few hours—or for months—depending on the relationship.
The abusive incident occurs when the tension finally breaks.
Usually, the abuser physically lashes out at the victim. Finally, in
the honeymoon phase, the abuser may apologize or be extra
affectionate to make up for the abuse. Once this phase is over, the
tension-building phase begins again. See generally Jennifer Focht,
The Cycle of Domestic Violence, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH RES.,
http://www.center4research.org/cycle-domestic-violence/
[https://perma.cc/L6LG-YG4V] (last visited Sept. 23, 2019);
Jeffrey Fagan, Cessation of Family Violence: Deterrence and
Dissuasion, 11 CRIME & JUST. 377, 387 (1989).
128. See generally Sherman & Harris, supra note 14.
129. Id. at 1–2.

455

Health Matrix·Volume 30·2020
Mandatory-Arrest Laws and Domestic Violence

First, he summarized subsequent research that was unable to
replicate his original findings.130 Instead, those studies found that,
in some instances, mandatory arrest was either ineffective or
doubled recidivism.131 Second, he gathered data in cases where
victims had reported their abuse to the police.132 His own research
suggested that more victims died in situations where police made
an arrest than where police only warned the offending partners.133
To gather data for his study, Sherman went back to the same
area that he first studied in Milwaukee.134
The main effect he discovered was that victims died
prematurely 64% more often in cases where the suspect had been
arrested than when the suspect was just warned.135 Heart disease
was twice as likely for those who had a partner arrested than it
was for those whose partner was warned.136 However, Sherman is
unable to provide any explanation for these findings. As of 2019,
no other study has replicated Sherman’s 2015 findings,137 and thus
his research is inconclusive. While Sherman’s second study’s
findings may not be very clear, other studies have found more
concrete evidence that mandatory-arrest laws are not effectively
helping victims.138
B.

Other Studies Evaluating the Effectiveness of Mandatory
Arrest

Using arrest as a “one size fits all” intervention does not
benefit all victims of domestic abuse in the same way.139 Overall,
130. Id. at 2.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 3.
135. Id. at 6.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g, Yoo-Mi Chin & Scott Cunningham, Revisiting the Effect
of Warrantless Domestic Violence Arrest Laws on Intimate
Partner Homicides, 179 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 9 (2019).
138. Iyengar, supra note 14, at 97.
139. Mary M. Cavanaugh & Richard J. Gelles, The Utility of Male
Domestic Violence Offender Typologies: New Directions for
Research, Policy, and Practice, 20 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
155, 164 (2005).
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other studies generally conclude that utilizing arrest has no
significant influence on reducing long-term abuser recidivism.140
For most abusers, any deterrent effect only lasted for a period of
up to six months.141 These studies also concluded that arrest has
different effects for different types of offenders.142 For batterers
who are employed, have limited arrest records, and are in more
“stable” environments, arrest had a greater deterrent effect.143
Batterers who are unemployed, have more extensive criminal
records, and are of lower socio-economic status experience little
to no deterrent effect because of the arrest.144 In some cases even,
the arrest would lead the batterer to kill their partner soon
after.145
To better understand offender reactions to different police
intervention methods, researchers developed four predominant
batterer typologies based on psychological traits.146 The first
140. Richard A. Berk et al., Bayesian Analysis of the Colorado Springs
Spouse Abuse Experiment, 83 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 170,
198, 200 (1992); J. David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchinson, Female
Spouse Abuse and the Police Response: The Charlotte, North
Carolina Experiment, 83 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 73, 85,
106 (1992); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The Variable Effects of
Arrest on Criminal Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence
Experiment, 83 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 137, 159–60
(1992).
141. Christopher D. Maxwell et al., The Preventive Effects of Arrest on
Intimate Partner Violence: Research, Policy and Theory, 2
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 51, 53 (2002); Hirschel & Hutchinson,
supra note 140, at 106.
142. Pate et al., supra note 125, at 695; Douglas A. Smith et al., Crime,
Punishment, and Stake in Conformity: Legal and Informal Control
of Domestic Violence, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 680, 686 (1992);
LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
EXPERIMENTS AND DILEMMAS 157 (1992).
143. Pate et al., supra note 125, at 695; Smith et al., supra note 142, at
686.
144. Sherman, supra note 142, at 163.
145. Pate et al., supra note 125, at 695.
146. Cavanaugh & Gelles, supra note 139, at 161; Amy HoltzworthMunroe & Gregory L. Stuart, Typologies of Male Batterers: Three
Subtypes and the Differences Among Them, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL.
476, 481 (1994); Matthew T. Huss & Anthony Ralston, Do Batterer
Subtypes Actually Matter? Treatment Completion, Treatment
Response and Recidivism Across a Batterer Typology, 35 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 710, 711–12 (2008); Jeffrey M. Lohn et al.,
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category consisted of family-only batterers.147 These individuals
are characterized by their lower severity of abuse, a lower
frequency of abuse, lack of personality disorders, lower violence
generally, and low to moderate rates of drug use and depression.148
The second group is called borderline/dysphoric batterers.149
These individuals have moderate to high rates of intimate-partner
violence, moderate rates of general violence, moderate drug use,
and do exhibit some personality disorders.150 The third subtype is
called the generally violent/antisocial batterers.151 These
individuals have moderate to high levels of intimate-partner
violence, high rates of generalized violence, and exhibit antisocial
disorders.152 The final group is called the low-level antisocial
batters.153 These abusers have moderate levels of family and
general violence, substance abuse issues, and moderate levels of
psychopathology.154
More recent studies have researched the relationship between
arrests and the reoffending of individuals in these different

Consistency and Accuracy of Batterer Typology Identification, 20
J. FAM. VIOLENCE 253 (2005); Amy Holtzworth-Munroe et al.,
Testing the Holtzworth-Munroe and Stuart Typology, J. CLINICAL
& CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 1000, 1000 (2000).
147. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 146, at 481; Richard R.
Johnson & Wendi Goodlin-Fahncke, Exploring the Effect of Arrest
Across a Domestic Batterer Typology, 66 JUVENILE AND FAM.
COURT J. 15, 17 (2015).
148. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 146, at 481–82; Johnson
& Goodlin-Fahncke, supra note 147, at 17.
149. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 146, at 482; Johnson &
Goodlin-Fahncke, supra note 147, at 17.
150. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 146, at 482; Johnson &
Goodlin-Fahncke, supra note 147, at 17.
151. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 146, at 482; Johnson &
Goodlin-Fahncke, supra note 147, at 17.
152. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 146, at 482; Johnson &
Goodlin-Fahncke, supra note 147, at 17.
153. Holtzworth-Munroe et al., supra note 146, at 1007; Johnson &
Goodlin-Fahncke, supra note 147, at 18.
154. Huss & Ralston, supra note 146, at 712; Johnson & GoodlinFahncke, supra note 147, at 18; Jill Thijssen & Corine de Ruiter,
Identifying Subtypes of Spousal Assaulters Using the B-SAFER, 26
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1307, 1309 (2011).
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subtypes.155 Overall, arrest displays no significant effect on any of
the batterer subtypes.156 Arrest also increased the likelihood of
future violence among the generally violent/antisocial and lowlevel antisocial batterer subtypes.157 In those groups, 35.2% of
batterers originally arrested were re-arrested for a new domestic
violence charge within six months compared to the 7.9% who
reoffended after being warned.158 This suggests that when these
types of batterers are arrested, they are more likely to react with
retributive violence towards their partner.159 Furthermore, the
study argued that officers should consider batterer subtypes when
deciding how to respond to domestic violence.160 For example,
those in the family-only subtype are just as deterred by warnings
as they are by arrest, with a lessened risk of retribution towards
the victim.161 Therefore, arrest may not be necessary for these
individuals. For those in the generally violent/antisocial and lowlevel antisocial subtypes arrest cannot work on its own.162
Researchers have found that follow-up actions, such as better
prosecution tactics, supervision of both the abuser and victim,
abuser treatment, and victim empowerment, make it less likely
that batterers will reoffend.163 Mandatory arrest alone does not
provide for these increased measures, with most batterers leaving
police custody only after a few days and with little supervision
after release.164 To account for this, some researchers argue that
increased pretrial interventions for those individuals actually

155. Johnson & Goodlin-Fahncke, supra note 147, at 16.
156. Id. at 26.
157. Id. at 26–27.
158. Id. at 24.
159. Id. at 27
160. Id.
161. Id. at 25.
162. Id. at 29; see Huss & Ralston, supra note 146, at 711, 721; Thijssen
& de Ruiter, supra note 154, at 1310.
163. Christy A. Visher et al., Reducing Intimate Partner Violence: An
Evaluation of a Comprehensive Justice System-Community
Collaboration, 7 CRIMINOLOGY AND PUB. POLICY 495, 496 (2008).
164. Id.
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arrested should be utilized in order to study their effects on
different batterer subtypes.165
More recent studies also indicate that mandatory-arrest laws
make it less likely that a victim will report their abuse.166
Domestic violence victimizations are only reported by fifty-six
percent of victims annually in the U.S.167 In states with
mandatory-arrest laws, this percentage can be even lower.168 On
average, about 582,000 domestic violence victimizations go
unreported each year.169 Victims who don’t report domestic
violence indicate that their decision to do so was informed by
factors such as personal privacy, a desire to protect the abuser,
their notion that the crime was minor, being financially
dependent on the abuser, and fear of retaliation.170 Accordingly,
victims rarely cite just one reason for not reporting; “it’s often a
grim mosaic of psychological damage, fear, love and
dependency.”171
C.

Mental Harm

Research also recognizes that prolonged exposure to domestic
violence can lead to mental disorders such as posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety.172 An estimated sixtyfour percent of those suffering from domestic violence will develop
a type of PTSD in their lifetime.173 It is also rare for victims to

165. Johnson & Goodlin-Fahncke, supra note 147, at 28.
166. Iyengar, supra note 14, at 89 n.14, 97.
167. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, POLICE RESPONSE
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 2006–2015, at 1 (2017).
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168. Cf. Iyengar, supra note 14, at 89.
169. REAVES, supra note 167, at 3.
170. Id. at 1.
171. Caitlin Russell, States Have Different Policies on How They
Approach Domestic Violence—and Many Don’t Have Any Policies
at All, MUCKROCK (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.muckrock.com/
news/archives/2017/oct/18/dv-policies/ [https://perma.cc/L8Y93A8C].
172. Mary Ann Dutton, Pathways Linking Intimate Partner Violence
and Posttraumatic Disorder, 10 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 211
(2009).
173. Id. at 212.
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develop only PTSD.174 Researchers estimate that forty-eight
percent of domestic violence victims also report suffering from
depression in conjunction with other psychological disorders.175
Symptoms of these disorders can be exacerbated by factors such
as the severity of the violence, length of exposure to that violence,
and by how the victim perceives that violence or their lack of
control over the situation.176
Mandatory-arrest statutes can exacerbate the severity of
psychological disorders such as PTSD. Because these laws can
reduce victim-reporting rates, they make it more likely that
victim will stay in the abusive relationship for an extended period
of time.177 This extends the time that they will have to suffer
violence. Extended exposure to violence can be a factor that
worsens the severity of victim’s symptoms over time.178 Because
domestic violence is cyclical, there is also a chance that the
severity of the violence itself will increase the longer the
relationship lasts.179 If a victim is fearful of reporting, then staying
in a relationship may feel like the only option for them. Their
mental well-being may be worse off in the long run because any
symptoms of psychological disorders will be worsened by any
increasing violence.180
D.

Physical Harm

Mandatory-arrest laws also increase the physical harm that
victims suffer due to domestic violence.181 While calling the police
may end the immediate violence, there is a chance that the
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. MARGARET J. HUGHES & LORING JONES, SAN DIEGO STATE UNIV.
SCH. OF SOC. WORK, WOMEN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND
POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER (PTSD) 5 (2000).
177. Zlatka Rakovec-Felser, Domestic Violence and Abuse in Intimate
Relationship from Public Health Perspective, 2 HEALTH PSYCHOL.
RES. 62 (2014).
178. See generally HUGHES & JONES, supra note 176, at 35.
179. See Understanding Abuse, U. MICH.: ABUSE HURTS, http://
stopabuse.umich.edu/about/understanding.html [https://perma.cc
/Y6LP-8ZFZ] (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).
180. See generally HUGHES & JONES, supra note 176, at 20.
181. Iyengar, supra note 14, at 88.
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violence may increase in the future due to the abuser being
arrested.182 In a Huffington Post Article, Nour Naas recounted the
story of her mother’s exposure to domestic violence.183 She wrote
that the first time that her mother called the police on her father,
“he had violently shaken her and had thrown a chair at her.”184
After her father returned from being arrested, he threatened to
kill her mother if she ever called them again.185 The next time the
police were called to the house, Nour’s mother was already dead
in an alley, her father having shot her seven times in the chest.186
Situations like this are all too common. Studies indicate that
the number of victim deaths due to domestic violence is higher in
states with mandatory-arrest laws than states that either have
preferred arrest or discretionary-based laws.187 Some have argued
that these laws are successful because deaths due to domestic
violence have decreased nationally over the past twenty years.188
However, researchers found that states with mandatory-arrest
laws have a domestic violence homicide rate that is sixty percent
higher than states with more discretionary laws.189 This is likely
a direct result of having mandatory-arrest laws on the books.
Because victims are less likely to report their abuse, they will be
stuck in the cycle of domestic violence for a prolonged period of
time.190 The cycle of domestic violence could then lead to their
partner killing them after the violence reaches a certain point.191

182. Id. at 88 n.9.
183. Nour Nass, When the Only Legal Option for Domestic Violence
Victims is to Not Survive, HUFF. POST (May 8, 2018, 5:46 AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opinion-naas-domesticviolence-police_us_5af0645ce4b0c4f19324d6e4 [https://perma.cc/
SL6R-8KRS].
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See Meghan A. Novisky & Robert L. Peralta, When Women Tell:
Intimate Partner Violence and the Factors Related to Police
Notification, 21 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 65, 67 (2015).
188. Pickert, supra note 45.
189. Id.; Iyengar, supra note 14.
190. Zlatka Rakovec-Felser, supra note 177.
191. Cf. Iyengar, supra note 14, at 88–89; Katie Zezima et al., Domestic
Slayings: Brutal and Foreseeable, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2018),
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Traumatic brain injuries can also develop as a side effect of
physical abuse. For example, in April 1999, a woman named
Carolyn received a call from her sister Paula’s husband.192 This
call came after several months of not hearing from her sister.193
Paula’s husband told Carolyn that her sister was hurt and in the
hospital.194 What he didn’t tell her was that Paula was in a coma
because he had beaten her so badly that doctors had to perform
emergency surgery to relieve pressure from her brain.195 Now
Carolyn has legal guardianship over her sister because of the
lasting effects from her abuse.196 In addition to developing a
seizure disorder, Paula now has vertigo, memory loss, and
cognitive issues that make it impossible for her to live on her
own.197
Traumatic brain injuries can be common in domestic violence
victims who are subjected to extended abuse.198 One study looked
at the prevalence of mild traumatic brain injuries in victims of
domestic violence.199 Out of the fifty-three individuals in the
sample, forty-nine (ninety-two percent) indicated their abusers
had a history of hitting them in the head or face.200 Most
participants reported “frequent and acute cognitive difficulties,
including current problems with being easily distracted;
forgetting appointments; having headaches; and having trouble
concentrating, paying attention, remembering things, and doing
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/investigations/d
omestic-violence-murders/ [https://perma.cc/DH6U-SZ72].
192. Sarah Kishpaugh, Insult to Injury: Who’s Left Out of the Picture
When We Talk About Traumatic Brain Injury?, BITCH MEDIA
(Sept. 6, 2018, 10:20 AM), https://www.bitchmedia.org/article/
traumatic-brain-injury-and-intimate-partner-violence
[https://
perma.cc/RRJ5-3ARV].
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Helene Jackson et al., Traumatic Brain Injury: A Hidden
Consequence for Battered Women, 33 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. &
PRAC. 39, 39 (2002).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 41.
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more than one thing at a time.”201 The researchers indicated that
these are all symptoms of a mild traumatic brain injury, which
can worsen the longer an individual is exposed to the violence.202
Because many victims are reluctant to call the police in
mandatory arrest jurisdictions, this exposure can be longer than
necessary.

IV. Recommendations
A.

Preferential Arrest

Instead of mandatory arrest, statutes should follow a
preferential-arrest model. One of the main problems with
mandatory arrest is that it addresses domestic violence strictly as
a crime without recognizing its place as a deeper social problem.
However, providing for a complete police deference model may
cause the system to revert back to the problems that caused
jurisdictions to enact mandatory-arrest laws in the first place.
Preferential arrest statutes provide a middle ground between
these two extremes. Under a preferential-arrest model, officers are
encouraged to arrest an offender in specific circumstances, such
as whether the victim was injured, whether a weapon was used,
or if the offender violated a restraining order.203 Even though
officers may be encouraged to arrest, they can still decide not to
arrest based on the situation at hand.204 This type of statute is
preferable for many reasons. The first is that it allows police to
retain discretion.205 Research has recognized that there are many

201. Id. at 41–42.
202. Id. at 43.
203. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311 (2)(A) (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-10 (2007).
204. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311 (2)(A) (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-10 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-113 (a)(1)(A) (2007);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(B) (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209a
§ 6 (7) (2010).
205. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311 (2)(A) (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-10 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-113 (a)(1)(A) (2007);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(B) (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209a
§ 6 (7) (2010).
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ways to respond to domestic violence based on victim needs.206
Victims also respond differently to different policing methods.207
Under the preferential-arrest mode,, police retain the ability to
evaluate different situations based on relevant factors.208 These
statutes also give more weight to the stories of the victim and the
suspect.209 That way, the victim can feel that their story is being
heard and the suspect can feel that they are being treated fairly
by the system.210
Montana’s domestic violence arrest statute reflects this
approach.211 The Montana Code provides that, “[a]rrest is the
preferred response in partner or family member assault cases
involving injury to the victim, use or threatened use of a weapon,
violation of a restraining order or other imminent danger to the
victim.”212 The first good component is that the statute indicates
that arrest is the “preferred response,” not the mandatory
response.213 The statute also includes several instances that
illustrate when arrest is the desired outcome.214 Finally, it
indicates that the jurisdiction has a policy of identifying the
primary aggressor in the particular situation.215 Rather than
providing a definition for what a “primary aggressor” is, the
statute includes several factors that officers should consider, for
206. See ULF HOLMBERG, POLICE INTERVIEWS WITH VICTIMS AND
SUSPECTS OF VIOLENT AND SEXUAL CRIMES: INTERVIEWEES’
EXPERIENCES AND INTERVIEW OUTCOMES 19 (2004).
207. Id.; see also Pamela Blass Bracher, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic
Violence: The City of Cincinnati’s Simple Solution to a Complex
Problem, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 179 (1996).
208. Iyengar, supra note 14, at 86.
209. See Jennifer R. Hagan, Can We Lose the Battle and Still Win the
War?: The Fight against Domestic Violence after the Death of Title
III of the Violence against Women Act, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 919,
976, 978 (2001) (discussing the weight of victims’ statements).
210. Id.; see also Bracher, supra note 207.
211. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311(2)(a) (2017).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. (“Arrest is the preferred response in partner or family member
assault cases involving injury to the victim, use or threatened use
of a weapon, violation of a restraining order, or other imminent
danger to the victim.”).
215. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311(2)(b) (2017).
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example the prior history of violence between the individuals (if
available), injuries, witness statements, and the apparent fear or
lack of fear between the parties.216 This is beneficial to the officers
because it allows them to consider a wide range of factors. These
factors also make it easier for officers to use their discretion to
determine when arrest would be the appropriate response.
Proponents of mandatory arrest may argue that preferential
arrest will only exacerbate the problems that caused mandatory
arrest statutes to be enacted in the first place. They posit that,
with increased discretion, police may not take domestic violence
calls seriously and victims will not get the assistance they need.217
However, research has indicated this attitude is no longer
prevalent in police departments as it was previously.218 Due to
exposure of nationwide problems with domestic violence,
jurisdictions have increased development of domestic violence
training programs.219 A majority of jurisdictions have written
policies and procedures instructing officers how to react during
domestic violence calls that promote consistency and best
practices.220
While police training has improved since mandatory-arrest
laws were largely enacted, it must improve further to ensure that
preferential arrest laws work as well as possible. Currently,
studies have shown that a majority of police academies only offer
an average of thirteen hours of domestic violence training.221
Many other matters, such as operations, firearms, self-defense,
and the use of force, have far more hours of training dedicated to

216. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-6-311(2)(b)(i) – (vi) (2017).
217. April Paredes et al., Domestic Violence, XIX GEO. J OF GENDER &
L. 265, 288 (2018).
218. Angela R. Gover et al., Law Enforcement Officers’ Attitudes About
Domestic Violence, 20 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1, 2, 8 (2011).
219. See MEG TOWNSEND ET
ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE
SERVICE 35 (2006).

AL., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, LAW
TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CALLS FOR

220. See id.
221. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT TRAINING ACADEMIES 7 (2013), available at https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/slleta13.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
B2UP-V6AK].
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them.222 In studies, some officers have even reported confusion
surrounding the complexities of domestic violence and “doubt in
identifying the primary aggressor and probable cause.”223
Continued training could therefore help officers who respond to
these incidents better determine how to act.224
Expanding police training is not without its own challenges.
Specifically, one of the main problems is inadequate state and
federal funding. However, jurisdictions switching over from a
mandatory to preferential arrest structure may be able to divert
funds normally used for processing suspects to instituting better
domestic violence training programs.225 As police departments will
likely have lower arrest rates, they will also likely have lower costs
associated with arrest for domestic violence.226
B.

Increased Outreach

In order to provide a more effective response to domestic
violence, police should also provide increased outreach and
services to victims. While many services geared towards helping
victims exist, many victims do not know how to access those
services or may be too scared to seek help.227 Furthermore, some
may criticize the preferential-arrest model because there is a
chance that officers may abuse their discretion or encounter a
victim that does not want to go through with an arrest or
prosecution of their case. Many argue that victims may not know
what is best for them and that declining to press charges may
exacerbate violence in the future.228 A way to combat these
problems is to increase police outreach to those victims that refuse
to press charges or whose abuser is not arrested by the police.
222. Gregory B. Morrison, Police Department and Instructor
Perspectives on Pre-service Firearm and Deadly Force Training,
29 POLICING: AN INT. J. OF POLICE STRATEGIES AND MGMT. 226,
228 (2005).
223. Gover, supra note 218, at 14.
224. Id. at 5.
225. See generally NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
Citation in Lieu of Arrest, NCSL (Mar. 3, 2019), http://www.
ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/citation-in-lieu-ofarrest.aspx [https://perma.cc/MVA8-P52Z].
226. Id.
227. See Zlatka Rakovec-Felser, supra note 177, at 62–63.
228. See generally Jackson, supra note 198, at 43–44.
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There are many programs that police departments can implement
in order to achieve this goal.
One such program is implementing dedicated follow-up
protocols for victims of domestic violence. Studies have found
that seventy-six percent of agencies report doing follow up
interviews with victims of domestic violence after an encounter
with the police.229 Most of the time, the individuals following up
are victims’ advocates, detectives, or the original responding
officer.230 However, there is little information on how these follow
ups are conducted. The best method would likely be an in-person
interview rather than a phone call. With an in-person follow up,
an officer would better be able to determine how the victim is
faring and whether abuse is ongoing.
In 2006, officers in High Point, North Carolina were
dispatched to a domestic disturbance between Darin Jackson and
his ex-girlfriend Annjanette Lloyd over a set of hair clippers.231
Six hours later, police received a call from Lloyd’s neighbor who
had been woken up by Lloyd’s eight-year-old son.232 When the
police arrived, he told them that Jackson had broken into the
house and stabbed his mom.233 Police discovered Lloyd lifeless
inside the house with sixty-three stab wounds and head trauma.234
When Jackson was arrested, he seemed to show no remorse.235
Officers would later become frustrated after learning from a
background check that Jackson had been arrested five days earlier
for punching Lloyd over a television.236 Jackson had only spent

229. The Police Executive Research Forum, Police Improve Response to
Domestic Violence, But Abuse Often Remains the ‘Hidden Crime’,
29 SUBJECT TO DEBATE 2, 6 (2015) [hereinafter Police Research
Forum].
230. Id.
231. John H. Tucker, Can Police Prevent Domestic Violence Simply By
Telling Offenders to Stop?, INDY WEEK (Nov. 13, 2013, 4:00 AM),
https://indyweek.com/news/northcarolina/can-police-preventdomestic-violence-simply-telling-offenders-stop/ [https://perma.cc
/H4XN-F29V].
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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one night in jail and was released.237 Not only that, but social
services had filed several domestic violence reports on the couple
throughout their relationship.238
It was in response to situations like these that the High Point
police department developed a method called “cocooning.”239
Under this method, victims are encouraged to surround
themselves with people who are aware of the domestic violence
and know the abuser’s identity.240 Police then ask for the contact
information of individuals within the victim’s security network so
that they can contact them in case they are unable to reach the
victim directly.241 Victims are also encouraged to appoint a
“proximity informant” or an individual who is aware of their
schedule from day to day and is in contact with them.242 This
individual should be able to see when something is out of the
ordinary and contact the police if anything is wrong.
This system in High Point has proven effective at saving
lives.243 In one instance, a neighbor saw that the victim’s car was
still in the driveway at a time where it was unusual for it to be
there.244 The neighbor was also able to see the victim’s exhusband’s car parked down the street.245 Because the neighbor
was the victim’s proximity informant, they were able to call the
police, who arrived to find the victim’s ex-husband threatening

237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Police Research Forum, supra note 229, at 8.
240. See generally Marty A. Sumner, High Point, NC Focuses on
Offenders to Deter Domestic Violence, BATTERED WOMEN’S
JUSTICE PRO., https://www.bwjp.org/resource-center/resourceresults/north-carolina-offender-focused-deterrence.html [https://
perma.cc/9VK6-JKQQ] (last visited Mar. 16, 2020); John Buntin,
How High Point, N.C., Solved Its Domestic Violence Problem,
GOVERNING (March 2016), https://www.governing.com/topics/
public-justice-safety/gov-domestic-violence-focused-deterrence
.html [https://perma.cc/55V5-RZB3].
241. Sumner, supra note 240.
242. Id.
243. Police Research Forum, supra note 229, at 8.
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245. Id.
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to kill her.246 In that case, the police were able to get the suspect
to surrender instead of finding another casualty of domestic
violence.247 While this may not be the proper solution in all cases,
increased community and police department awareness of where
actual threats of domestic violence are can help save lives and
keep victims safe.
Other police departments have taken a different approach by
designating specific units with a goal of fighting domestic violence
within their community.248 Specifically, the Citrus Heights police
department in California developed a program called the
Domestic Violence Response Team (“DVRT”).249 This program
involved detectives and patrol officers from the police department
along with victims’ advocates from a local victims’ advocacy
group.250 These individuals all train together with the police
department to respond to domestic violence calls.251 The
department developed a three-tiered response for officers and
advocates to follow when responding to domestic violence.252 In
the first tier, advocates will ride with officers to incidents.253 In
the second tier, advocates will stay on call and respond to an
incident if prompted by an officer.254 In the third tier, incidents
are not as severe and do not require an immediate response.255
Here, advocates will go to the victim’s residence and follow up

246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.; Jacqueline Fox, Compassion Through Action, CITRUS HEIGHTS
MESSENGER,
http://www.citrusheightsmessenger.com/articles/
2018/0221-Compassion-Through-Action/index.php?ID=4499
[https://perma.cc/HQ5D-2V2E] (last visited Mar. 17, 2019).
250. Kelly Kultys, Quick Response: How Domestic Violence Response
Team Works to Help Victims, THE INTELLIGENCE (Feb. 3, 2019,
5:00
AM),
https://www.theintell.com/news/20190203/quickresponse-how-domestic-violence-response-team-works-to-helpvictims [https://perma.cc/7SP5-T95V].
251. Id.; Fox, supra note 249.
252. Police Research Forum, supra note 229, at 8.
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with them the next day.256 For each call, the dispatch officer will
determine what tier the call is and inform victim’s groups
accordingly. In each tier, victims’ advocates will supply the
victims with information about their services and other
information to help the victim deal with domestic violence and
hopefully leave the relationship in the future.257
This program has been very successful.258 In Citrus Heights,
before the program was enacted, eight percent of victims were
using victims’ services.259 Presently, department studies have
shown that seventy-two percent of contacted victims follow up
and receive services from the local victims’ advocacy group.260
Other police departments across the country have also begun
utilizing the DVRT model to help victims within their
jurisdictions.261
This system is beneficial for many reasons. First, it recognizes
that not every instance of domestic violence is the same. By
implementing a tiered system, officers and advocates can tailor
their response to the situation that they are called to. Second, it
brings together the efforts of police departments and victims’
advocacy groups. By combining the efforts of both organizations,
victims can get support from two different places instead of one.
They get both the legal support of the police department and the
emotional and medical support of the victims’ advocacy groups.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 9
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See Elizabeth Sauter, Domestic Violence Response Team,
OREGON,
https://www.hillsboro-oregon.gov/
HILLSBORO,
departments/police/programs/domestic-violence-response-team
[https://perma.cc/D5UE-R8LZ] (last visited Mar. 16, 2019); Libor
Jany, $100,000 State Grant to Fund New Minneapolis-Based
Domestic Violence Pilot Program, STAR TRIBUNE (Mar. 12, 2019),
http://www.startribune.com/100-000-state-grant-to-fund-newminneapolis-based-domestic-violence-pilot-program/507060932/
[https://perma.cc/W7N6-PLA8]; Mark Heyne, New Domestic
Violence Emergency Response Team, CINCINNATI PUB. RADIO
(Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.wvxu.org/post/new-domesticviolence-emergency-response-team#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/
9JUB-5DU9].
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Finally, this approach gives victims better access to and
understanding of the services available to them. In more
traditional jurisdictions, it is the police officers who are supplying
victims with information about the places that can provide them
support.262 Then it is left entirely up to the victim to reach out
and secure the services themselves.263 By having a victims’
advocate come with the police officer, the victim is more likely to
respond to the information and gain a better understanding about
how they can use those services than they would from an officer
alone.

Conclusion
As more research is done on domestic violence as a whole,
jurisdictions across the country have begun to take it seriously as
a crime rather than as a private family problem. While these
developments are important, law enforcement’s reliance on
mandatory-arrest laws as a solution is misguided and more
harmful to victims overall. Domestic violence is not a crime that
can benefit from a “one size fits all” solution. As research has
indicated, the psychology behind each domestic abuser can differ
along with their responses to different types of police intervention.
When arrest is used in isolation, the laws that were meant to help
victims instead put them in increasing danger.
This does not mean that arrest should never be used in
domestic violence situations. Instead, arrest cannot work as a
deterrent to domestic abusers alone in most situations. If arrest
is to be used, police departments need to develop further
procedures in order to protect victims from any further
retributive abuse. The solutions utilized in Citrus Heights and
High Point are good examples of police departments
implementing new and inventive solutions to the dangerous
effects that arrest can have on a domestic violence situation. In
these jurisdictions, the police are involved in getting victims help
and attempt to stay ahead of any further violence.
While these procedures are a step in the right direction,
further research is still needed. There is a dearth of information
262. Metropolitan Police Department, The Police Can Help in Domestic
Violation Situations, DC.GOV, https://mpdc.dc.gov/page/policecan-help-domestic-violence-situations
[https://perma.cc/EQ2KWKRF] (last visited March 4, 2020).
263. Id.
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on how different policing methods fare in different areas.
Individuals in low socio-economic areas may not respond to a
method that works in a middle-class area. Furthermore, studies
should be conducted to see how these methods fare with
individuals of different races, genders, and sexual orientations.
More information on the subject would help jurisdictions still
implementing mandatory-arrest laws to view domestic violence as
not just a crime, but also as a complex social issue.
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